BREAKING NEWS: FTC’s Case Against Fortune Hi Tech Removed to Kentucky

FTC - FHTM case transferred to Kentucky | MLM AttorneyIn February of 2013, the FTC filed a lawsuit against Fortune Hi Tech Marketing. The lawsuit was filed in Federal Court in Chicago. The FTC is alleging that FHTM operates as a pyramid scheme. As mentioned in my last article, the FTC passed on the scalpel and picked up the sledgehammer. Basically, they departed from their traditional, math-based pyramid scheme arguments and went for a more generic approach. This new strategy is even worse than the other one. If it sticks, it represents a significant threat to the industry. Based on the FTC’s argument, rewards triggered via distributor consumption are illegal recruitment bonuses. This is a very important case.

Time for the Update

FHTM filed a motion to get the case transferred to federal court in Kentucky. Kentucky is the home state for the company and most of the principals. The judge in Chicago punted the file to Kentucky. The factors considered when deciding on such a transfer include:

(1) site of material events relative to the case;
(2) relative ease of access to sources of proof;
(3) convenience of the parties litigating;
(4) convenience for the witnesses.

This is big for two reasons. First, the judge in Chicago thought so little of the case that he sent it south. If he wanted it, he could’ve kept it. Second, the law in Kentucky is clearer with respect to pyramid schemes. It states:

Pyramid distribution plan” means any plan, program, device, scheme, or other process by which a participant gives consideration for the opportunity to receive compensation or things of value in return for inducing other persons to become participants in the program;
(5) “Compensation” means payment of any money, thing of value, or financial benefit conferred in return for inducing others to become participants in the pyramid distribution plan. Compensation does not include payment based on sales of goods or services by the person or by other participants in the plan to anyone, including a participant in the plan, who is purchasing the goods or services for actual use or consumption…..

Again, the FTC was initially arguing that commissions triggered via internal consumption are illegal bonuses. But the statute in Kentucky says the exact opposite. This case is FAR from over. There’s likely going to be a hearing next week in Kentucky regarding the injunction over Fortune Hi Tech. If FHTM wins, they’re back in business. The judge’s reasoning for sending the case to Kentucky is included below.

If you’re reading this via email, please click this link to read the judge’s opinion.

The FTC Is Now Regulating Boxing

FTC Regulating Boxing

See below for the FTC’s latest effort to protect people across the country.

Begin Press Release

The FTC has been commissioned to address the growing belief that shorter men can actually compete at a high level in professional boxing. In fact, after conducting surveys over a period of four years, speaking with numerous experts (none of whom have actually boxed), the FTC has ultimately concluded that the empowering message of the Rocky franchise to be misleading for prospective boxers throughout the country. This report is intended to provide guidance for coaches and trainers going forward when they’re soliciting involvement from young fighters.

As per our newly published guidelines, trainers and coaches are required to obtain separate signatures on a disclosure document from prospective fighters before they begin training. The disclosure document addresses numerous myths associated with the Rocky character as well any false expectations held by prospective fighters. The disclosure document must contain a “purpose statement,” which is included below. The purpose statement must be included in red, 16 pt san serif font, center justified, all caps bold. The purpose statement must also be read aloud in English, Spanish, Mandarin and Russian.

THERE ARE BETTER WAYS OF EARNING A LIVING. WE, THE COACHES AND TRAINERS, STRONGLY ENCOURAGE YOU TO GET REAL JOBS. BUT IF YOU DECIDE TO PROCEED WITH A DREAM OF MAKING IT AS A BOXER, THIS IS A REQUIRED DISCLOSURE BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The disclosure must state:

The average annualized income for all active Boxers during this period (before expenses) was $8.37. The average boxer can expect to suffer much and earn little.

Regarding the Rocky franchise: Rocky Balboa is a fictional character. Statistically, a 5’8″ Italian man over the age of 30 has zero shot of winning a heavyweight boxing title. Chasing chickens has not been scientifically proven to make you faster. There has never been a man that could really piss lightning or crap thunder. Pounding frozen meat has not been validated as an effective way to improve hand strength. After our medical advisory board reviewed the original Rocky film, they concluded that Rocky Balboa would have suffered 27 concussions at the hands of Apollo Creed before the final bell.

There are no guarantees of income as a fighter. Boxers that fail are condemned socially, labeled “wishful thinkers.”

End

FTC Shuts Down Fortune Hi-Tech Marketing, Summons the Krakan

Peter Vander Nat

As most of you know, the FTC has filed a lawsuit against Fortune Hi-Tech Marketing, alleging them to be a pyramid scheme. This is the first action taken by the FTC against an MLM since December of 2006. The most informative pleading that shows the FTC’s position is the memorandum supporting the FTC’s motion for an injunction. WARNING: It’s 54 pages…and boring. When describing these cases, I’ve found that it’s always best to give a brief summary of the business model.

Fortune Hi-Tech Marketing (“FHTM”) Business Model

FHTM_logoFHTM is a network marketing company that specializes in selling nutritional supplements and beauty products. It also dabbles in selling cable and telecom services. Participants join FHTM by paying a $250 administrative fee. In order to qualify their positions, these “Managers” are required to move (buy or sell) 1,000 volume points. This usually costs between $100 and $400 per month, totaling at least $1,200 annually in product sales / purchases.

Managers can advance to “Regional Sales Managers” by recruiting six additional Managers. RSMs can advance higher by recruiting additional Managers. RSMs are eligible to earn $100 for each new Manager in their downline. While the new Manager doesn’t generate $100 worth of margin based on his or her product purchase, I doubt FHTM is using money from the $250 enrollment for the $100 bonus (which would obviously be a recruitment bonus). Instead, they’re probably allocating some of the breakage in the plan from unpaid commissions from product sales i.e. the majority of reps do not hit the RSM rank; therefore, there’s plenty of money in the pot for the bonus. Using Vander Nat’s “perfect scenario” theory, assuming everyone were to hit the RSM rank, the plan breaks. The FTC is exploiting this as a weakness in the plan.

FTC’s Thesis

The FTC’s thesis is simple: the FHTM products are merely incidental to the money making opportunity. The FTC makes itself clear: while FHTM talks about “selling product,” the references to sales are cosmetic designed to conceal a money transfer scheme. Additionally, the FTC is arguing that the structure of the pay plan itself is turbo-charged to reward recruitment over legitimate product sales.

FTC’s Purported Expert a/k/a the Kraken

Peter Vander Nat

The FTC’s attack dog throughout the years has consistently been its economist, Dr. Peter Vander Nat. Vander Nat co-wrote an article titled “Marketing Fraud: An Approach for Differentiating Multilevel Marketing from Pyramid Schemes.” In the article, Vander Nat publishes his math formula that he uses when reviewing a multilevel marketing program. Vander Nat is an interesting anomaly in the MLM industry. In my opinion, he’s similar to the the Kraken in Pirates of the Caribbean. In the movie, the Kraken is a large beast residing in the depths of the ocean, only to surface when called upon by its master to destroy a vessel. And when the job is done, it vanishes…

Vander Nat operates in simliar fashion. While the FTC recognizes the legitimacy of the MLM industry, their chosen expert does not share the same sentiment. I suspect they keep him locked behind closed doors for years, only to use his services when they need to sink a ship fast. Can you blame them? Vander Nat has never once found an MLM legal using his math formula. I’m not kidding. In the FTC’s case against BurnLounge, Vander Nat’s credibility as a witness is being contested at the appellate level. In its brief, BurnLounge references Vander Nat’s deposition transcript and writes:

Vander Nat had never studied any MLMs that he concluded were legal. He could not testify that using his analysis, one would ever find an MLM to be legal. . . Nothing was presented to show that his test had gained widespread acceptance. He likewise admitted that he did not know if his test complied with the Koscot/Omnitrition test.”

If you want the full text, check out page 43 of BurnLounge’s Appellate Brief.

I’m not making this up. The FTC’s expert, the man charged with distinguishing good companies from bad companies, has created an impossible standard. And furthermore, if you review his math formula published in his article, it requires a doctorate in quantum physics to truly understand. As if that’s not enough, central to his formula is this definition of “retail sales.” He writes, “We rely on Omnitrition’s findings that for purposes of pyramid analysis, the sale of product to ultimate users means the sale of product to those who are outside the organization.” In other words, for purposes of his formula, commissions triggered via internal consumption are considered “recruitment bonuses.” When you control the terminology, you control the outcome.

On a side note, his reliance on Omnitrition is misplaced. Omnitrition was never held to be a pyramid scheme. But I digress…

What does the FTC say on the issue of MLM internal consumption? Unlike Vander Nat, the FTC takes a softer stance on the subject when it writes, “In fact, the amount of internal consumption in any multi-level compensation business does not determine whether or not the FTC will consider the plan a pyramid scheme.” Clearly, there’s some incompatibility between the FTC’s public statements and their arguments made in litigation. Do they reserve the Kraken for what they perceive to be the most egregious of companies? It appears to be the case.

Why Fortune Hi Tech Marketing

Just to be clear, I’m not defending the Fortune Hi Tech model. I lack adequate information to form an opinion one way or the other. I’ve learned that it’s ill-advised to form an opinion based on the initial complaint. But I do know this: FHTM is isolated. The DSA rolled them under the bus and it only took them 24 hours after the FTC filed its lawsuit. FHTM is not part of the tribe, which means they’re not going to score many sympathy points from industry participants. Will this hurt them? I think so. If they survive the injunction (very high bar there), there’s not going to be enough positive press to keep their sales force engaged. The industry, traveling in a pack, will keep moving in a herd knowing full well that occasionally, some get eaten.

The FTC’s allegations can be summarized in two small sections.

(1) Recruitment Culture.

FHTM heavily emphasizes recruitment over sales. In fact, the FTC commonly places sales in quotes i.e. “sales.” They know that there’s a theoretical opportunity for sales, they just dismiss it as fake. They allege that as a requirement for participation in the plan, Managers must buy (or “sell”) a certain amount of inventory each month. This amount averages over $1,200 per year. Are the prices inflated? The FTC never says one way or the other. The FTC also accuses FHTM of overstating the benefits of their partnerships with nationally known brands i.e. DISH Network, Xoom Energy, etc. The FTC alleges that Managers in FHTM tout these partnerships as validation of the model; however, there’s very little commission to be gained from those sales because those partnerships are just “run-of-the-mill affiliate agreements.”

(2) Income Claims.

FHTM allows its sales force to make inappropriate income claims. The FTC provides a number of crazy claims made by leaders and executives. These statements were taken from all over the place, including company meetings, YouTube videos and, most surprisingly, Twitter. If you’re an executive for an existing MLM, pay attention. Compliance matters. While FHTM has an income disclosure document, the FTC is alleging that FHTM never made it a priority to get it in the hands of prospects. Also, the FTC alleges that the income disclosure document uses fuzzy math to reach its numbers because it excluded a large population of the sales force.

Due Process?

dueprocessDoes it make you nervous knowing that the Federal government can shut down a long-standing business without a judicial hearing? Critic or not, it’s disturbing. If FHTM is a flaming pyramid, it would never have survived a hearing. After being in business for over a decade, where is the imminent threat referenced by the FTC in its motion for an immediate injunction? The Critics, who commonly take a “win at all cost” approach, even if it means heralding a felon as their champion, will say “serves them right!” But be careful…

“And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned ’round on you, where would you hide, sir, the laws all being flat? . . . And if you cut them down, and you’re just the man to do it, do you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake!” Sir Thomas More, A Man For All Seasons.

If you’re reading this via email, please click this link to view the FTC’s memorandum in support of its motion.

After Six Year Slumber, FTC Wakes Up Big And Goes After Fortune Hi Tech

BREAKING NEWS:

The FTC has sued Fortune Hi Tech marketing, alleging them to be a pyramid scheme.  As of today, an injunction has been issued.  Read below for the FTC’s press release.  Also, a copy of the complaint is provided below.

FHTM Promoted Itself as a Path to Financial Independence, But Most People Made Little or No Money

At the request of the Federal Trade Commission and the states of Illinois, Kentucky, and North Carolina, a federal court has halted an allegedly illegal pyramid scheme pending trial.  The FTC and the state attorneys general seek to stop the allegedly illegal practices of the Fortune Hi-Tech Marketing (FHTM) operation, which claimed consumers would make substantial income by joining the scheme.  The operation affected more than 100,000 consumers throughout the United States, including Puerto Rico, and Canada.  In some areas, including Chicago, the scheme targeted Spanish-speaking consumers.

“Pyramid schemes are more like icebergs,” said C. Steven Baker, Director of the FTC’s Midwest Region.  “At any point most people must and will be underwater financially.  These defendants were promising people that if they worked hard they could make lots of money.  But it was a rigged game, and the vast majority of people lost money.”

According to the complaint filed by the FTC and the state attorneys general, the defendants falsely claimed consumers would earn significant income for selling the products and services of companies such as Dish Network, Frontpoint Home Security, and various cell phone providers, and for selling FHTM’s line of health and beauty products.  Despite FHTM’s claims, nearly all consumers who signed up with the scheme lost more money than they ever made.  To the extent that consumers could make any income, however, it was mainly for recruiting other consumers, and FHTM’s compensation plan ensured that most consumers made little or no money, the complaint alleged.

“This is the beginning of the end for one of the most prolific pyramid schemes operating in North America,” Kentucky Attorney General Jack Conway said.  “This is a classic pyramid scheme in every sense of the word.  The vast majority of people, more than 90 percent, who bought in to FHTM lost their money.”

As alleged in the complaint, FHTM promoted itself as a way for average people to achieve financial independence.  Some FHTM representatives claimed they earned more than 10 times as much as their previous earnings in their second and subsequent years with FHTM.  One person claimed that another representative earned more than $50,000 in his sixth month and millions of dollars in subsequent years.  Another person promoted a recruitment meeting on her Twitter account, stating, “Bring ur friends & learn how 2 make $120K aYR.”  At its 2012 national convention in Dallas, FHTM called its top 30 earners to the stage to present them with a mock-up of a $64 million check, which several of them shared as a photo on social networking websites.

To participate in the scheme, consumers paid annual fees ranging from $100 to $300.  To qualify for sales commissions and recruiting bonuses, they had to pay an extra $130 to $400 per month and agree to a continuity plan that billed them monthly for products unless they canceled the plan.  Those who signed up more consumers and maintained certain sales levels could earn promotions and greater compensation, but contrary to FHTM’s claims, the complaint alleged, its compensation plan ensured that, at any given time, most participants would spend more money than they would earn.

According to the complaint, recruits were told they could earn high commissions by selling products to people outside the operation, but instead only minimal compensation was paid for sales to non-participants, and few products were ever sold to anyone other than participants.  The scheme provided much larger rewards for recruiting people than for selling products, and more than 85 percent of the money consumers made was for recruitment.

In addition to charging the defendants with operating an illegal pyramid scheme and making false earnings claims, the FTC charged them with furnishing consumers with false and misleading materials for recruiting more participants.  The attorneys general offices of Illinois, Kentucky and North Carolina joined the FTC complaint, as well as alleging violations of their respective state laws.

The defendants are Paul C. Orberson, Thomas A. Mills, Fortune Hi-Tech Marketing Inc., FHTM Inc., Alan Clark Holdings LLC, FHTM Canada Inc., and Fortune Network Marketing (UK) Limited.  On January 24, 2013, the court halted the deceptive practices, froze the defendants’ assets, and appointed a temporary receiver over the corporations pending a trial.

The Commission vote, including Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, authorizing the staff to file the complaint was 5-0.  The complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

If you’re reading this via email, please click this review the FTC vs. Fortune Hi Tech lawsuit.

Herbalife: Why I Made It a 35% Position after the Bill Ackman Bear Raid

This is a guest post prepared by Robert Chapman. Chapman is the founder of Chapman Capital LLC, which is a Los Angeles based investment company specializing in takeovers and turnarounds. In 2000, Chapman Capital was an activist versus Herbalife following the death of Herbalife’s founder Mark Hughes. This is an amazing article. It’s well-researched and easy to understand.  If you’re remotely curious about the future of Herbalife after Ackman’s attack, the mechanics of short selling and the potential value of Herbalife’s stock, this is a MUST read. If you find this article informative, hit the +1 or Like buttons above. Sincerely, +Kevin Thompson

Note: Note: Below is the opinion of Chapman Capital LLC and is not a recommendation or an indication of Chapman Capital’s current or future intent to buy, sell or otherwise transact in Herbalife common shares.

Update: Robert Chapman made some slight revisions to the article. His points are the same; however, he made a few stylistic changes.

As anyone even remotely connected to the world of multi level marketing is surely aware, the perpetually sanctimonious Bill Ackman and his extremely successful investment advisory firm Pershing Square formally launched a massive bear raid on Herbalife (HLF) on 12/20/2012, conducting a 3+ hour, media-packed, web-streamed 300+ PowerPoint slide deck presentation in New York after first selling short 20MM HLF shares for as estimated $1 billion plus in proceeds.   In his presentation and numerous interviews with the business media that day, Ackman declared a target price of zero for HLF’s shares.  In other words, he claims to be so convinced that Herbalife operates an illegal pyramid scheme, he is certain that government authorities and/or HLF’s distributors/salespeople/customers will shortly put the company out of business.

SUMMARY INVESTMENT THESIS: Despite beguiling and specious reasoning, Ackman will fail to influence/cause a material regulatory response or a HLF distributor exodus. Consequently, he will suffer a merciless short squeeze, catalyzed and augmented by a fast and furious combination of HLF share count shrinkage (buyback) and excellent operating performance (beat and raise dynamic).

REGUATORY SUMMARY: FTC has been there, done that.

The Ackman Tell. Many poker games are won and lost upon that infamous turning point when a player properly reads his opponent’s “tell.” To wit, I am confident that during an interview with CNBC’s Andrew Ross Sorkin on “D-Day” (12/20/2012), Bill Ackman slipped his “tell”, confirming my suspicion that he already realized the FTC wasn’t going to make his day by shutting down HLF. I strongly recommend all HLF traders/investors read the transcript of this interview, as Sorkin does a masterful job of fighting the media urge to genuflect before Ackman’s drawn down zipper, otherwise known as “The Whitney Tilson”. Specifically, Sorkin, after hammering Ackman, asked toward the end of this interview, “This is somewhat dependent on the FTC taking action. If they don’t, what happens?” Now, remember that Ackman’s entire thesis rests on his certitude (so he claims) that HLF is an illegal pyramid scheme, which the FTC has a mandate to shut down. If you were 100% certain (with 20% of HLF shorted in your funds alone) of this claim, wouldn’t your answer be, “There is no way the FTC doesn’t take action to shut down the illegal pyramid scheme run by Herbalife.” Instead, Ackman diffidently responds, “I think the FTC is going to take a very hard look. But I think most importantly the new distributor someone is trying to suck into the scheme will be better informed …”

The moment I read this response, after having researched HLF on/off since 2000 (when Chapman Capital had been an activist in HERBA/HERBB shares during Mark Hughes’ LBO efforts), I decided I had to place a monster long bet on HLF. I believe Ackman already had concluded the FTC wasn’t going to assist his crusade. Instead, he realized that he had to focus on existing and prospective HLF distributors, praying the media attention would have a materially deleterious impact on any decision to join or to continue with the HLF team. Indeed, without the FTC taking injunctive actions against HLF, Ackman’s crusade toward “zero” is doomed.

Here are key bullet points on the lack of real regulatory risk to HLF shares:

Internal Consumption Issue Already Clarified/Resolved by FTC in 2004: “the amount of internal consumption in any multi-level compensation business does not determine whether or not the FTC will consider the plan a pyramid scheme” is a quote from an FTC letter dated 01/14/2004. Essentially, the letter states that if a product is marketable, the FTC is OK with the MLM, making Einhorn’s 05/01/2012 call focusing questions on this internal consumption issue far less relevant than was (mis)understood.

FTC Material Adverse Actions Near Zero Probability:  during my due diligence, I spoke with the country’s top lawyer specializing in MLM/regulatory dynamics. During our conversation, he offered his legal opinion, pointedly stating that there won’t be any FTC injunction, much less any regulatory action to put HLF out of business (“hell freezes over before this happens”). If there is regulatory action of any kind, it simply will be some type of consent order/settlement addressing better disclosure.

Few Consumer Complaints:  the FTC has not received many consumer complaints on HLF products – only 37 in 2010, 36 in 2009, and YTD 05/2012 was only 18 (again around 40 annually).

HLF is Big, Time Tested Veteran:  the FTC can and will shut down companies violating MLM rules, just as it did BurnLounge (online music retailer) in 03/2012 and Equinox in 2000. While such action is rare, the FTC will act aggressively to shut down companies when it sees the need. During the 32 years of HLF’s existence, the FTC has yet to see the need to pursue Herbalife.

Ackman Relied Greatly on Old Cases, Leaving Out Material Facts – Ackman failed point out that the FTC has already commented about the relevance (or lack thereof) of the cases he referenced in his presentation. In fact, most of the post Einhorn reporting has been misleading information;

No Federal Clarity – lots of Grey:  No “bright line” federal statute against pyramid schemes; even the guy with jihad against MLM’s, Pyramid Scheme Alert’s Robert FitzPatrick, conceded that FTC decided too complex to regulate MLM’s in 09/2011 and other anti-MLM consumer protectors have as well; this MLM lawyer thinks DSA should fight for bright line federal standards to eliminate opportunity for short sellers to exploit the grey;

Vast Preponderance of Sales and Growth are International (i.e., Outside Ackman/FTC): 80% of HLF’s business overseas.

The DSA is an Effective Lobby: The DSA serves as a lobbying entity designed to protect the MLM industry from burdensome government regulations. It led a campaign in 2006 where 17,000 comments were submitted to the FTC, all requesting an exemption from the restrictive requirements in the Business Opportunity rule. The DSA was successful. The DSA is more powerful that Ackman’s ally, Pyramid Scheme Alert’s Robert FitzPatrick

DISTRIBUTOR SUMMARY:  “Bill who?”

Chapman Capital’s distributor surveys show no meaningful percentage of distributors had even heard about Ackman’s circus show. Moreover, their evangelical commitment to HLF and confusion as to what 300+ pages of PowerPoint means seem to be causing an acceleration of business growth. Ackman’s payment for Google Ads (pegged to “Herbalife” search) exhibits his desperation to influence distributors, efforts which appear to have negligible effect.

TAILWINDS — FAT TAILS AND BUSINESS BAILS  HLF has two secular tailwinds in its favor: lots of fat people (fat “tails”) and no shortage of structurally un/underemployed humans. In fact, one thought for a short in HLF to consider is the following: net/net, does the U.S. government benefit from fewer overweight Americans (lower insurance costs) and fewer people standing in unemployment lines (ever hear of a fiscal cliff problem with U.S. budget?)? If the U.S. government benefits from HLF’s impact on the country’s physical and fiscal health, while enduring only 40 complaints/year about HLF, why shut down HLF? Ponder that for a moment.

BACKGROUND: Short seller roadkill HLF shares were trading as high as $45/share on 12/14/2012, and had been over $70/share (a high teens P/E multiple) earlier this year before the highly respected investor David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital asked some leading questions on an earnings call that implied he was skeptical that Herbalife was operating within the Amway safe harbor guidelines for multi-level marketers. Fear of Einhorn’s excellent record of identifying overvalued short sale targets sent HLF shares into the $40’s in the spring. In contrast, Ackman has been somewhat vague as to when he built the preponderance of his short position (i.e., did he start before Einhorn’s 05/01/2012 questions or was he an unoriginal shadow to Einhorn’s trailblazing?), but I am guessing $50-55/share is his average short cost basis. There is no evidence Einhorn went short at that time or since, but I would be shocked if Greenlight would maintain HLF short positions anywhere near $30/share based on HLF’s international value alone.

Open interest on HLF puts accelerated and the stock’s relative weakness worsened in the fall of 2012 as, I suspect – No evidence here. I’ve just been around the block a few times – people “around” Ackman shorted HLF or bought HLF puts ahead of 12/20/2012 presentation. In fact, I have a pet theory that Ackman’s interest in going massively public was heightened (if not driven) by the HLF stock’s reasonably strong response (into mid-$50/share) attendant with impressive late July and October 2012 financial results. Essentially, my hypothesis is that Ackman, with overall 2012 performance impaired by JCP’s descent into the teens, came to conclude he needed a big winner before year-end 2012.

As word leaked into the market of Ackman’s intention to present publicly the bear case on Herbalife, the stock began a gradual decline, then fell suddenly from ~$41/share to $36/share in the closing market hours of 12/19/2012, when a CNBC reporter with big hair reported that market rumors were true. The next morning, as the PT Barnum of the hedge fund industry delivered his presentation in a New York hotel ballroom on 12/20/2012, and especially through the early trading hours of 12/21/2012 (a very illiquid trading day), the shares went into free fall, reaching a nadir of $24.40/share. My funds made their last purchases at $25.30/share in a brief but painful period of negative marks. HLF shares have since rebounded to ~$30/share as traders/investors have taken a closer look at whether the emperor is running around New York denuded (figuratively speaking . . . fortunately).

ACKMAN’S TIMING OF “INTEREST” Ackman’s end-of-same-year-that-Einhorn-showed-up timing was masterful – when it comes to the power of influence, only top hypnotists can compete. A classic bear raid involves creating abject panic in the market. Concurrently using the proximity to Christmas, the December option expiration, and the depth of his presentation, the Ackman impact on the shares was maximized. The last ten days of December are as quiet as it gets on Wall Street, with most decision makers leaving for vacation, drying up market depth and liquidity. Also, at the peak of the panic not many institutional investors felt the urge to have HLF show up in their 12/31/2012 Form 13-F filing. December is also the final month of HLF’s fiscal year, which puts them in a “blackout period,” prohibiting the company and insiders from repurchasing shares under the $950mm authorized buyback. Moreover, due to the extensive audit period that attends year-end, it will be several months before year-end 2012 results were reported. This blackout removes HLF’s most effective defense to the bear raid: executing a nearly $1 billion share repurchase authorization. Again, if timing is everything, Ackman is every woman (with a nod to Whitney Houston).

PERSHING SQUARE/ACKMAN RESUME:  Let’s review some history on Bill Ackman and Pershing Square, some color on the mechanics of short selling, and Herbalife’s response to the bear raid to date.

Bill Ackman manages a New York based hedge fund called Pershing Square with exceptionally good long-term results. Ackman is not known as a short seller. His fund is generally a long-biased fund. He achieved some notoriety for predicting that muni-bond insurer MBIA was undercapitalized, which eventually proved true during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. His enormous investment in General Growth Properties (GGP) at less than $1/share remains one of the most impressive brains/balls combinations I have ever seen. All the while, however, his ego seems boundless.

He is somewhat unusual among usually media averse hedge fund managers in that his strategy involves publicly trumpeting the merits (and genius) of his investments, which he generally holds for a long time. He manages a concentrated portfolio comprised of very few, very large investments. He also is considered an activist investor. He frequently badgers the board and management of the companies in which he invests with what start as suggestions and frequently escalate to demands as to how they should conduct their business, what their capital structure should be, and the composition of its board.

Though he will rarely, if ever, publicly concede, Ackman makes mistakes just like the rest of us, even catastrophic financial ones (e.g., call options on Target). Indeed, Ackman closed down a previous hedge fund advisory entity called Gotham Partners after he reportedly marooned his investment funds in an illiquid and devastating combination of a closely held REIT (First Union Real Estate) and a portfolio of golf courses (Gotham Golf) for which no exit was possible. So while Ackman is quite good at what he does for a living, his hubris makes him vulnerable to spectacular failure. He has a high financial IQ, but it may be the delusional and narcissistically 15 surplus IQ points he awards himself that have been, and may again be, his undoing. Think of him as the Reggie Jackson (I’m dating myself here) of Wall Street: he swings for the fences, but can cause a lot of pain and break a lot of hearts – or the bank – when he whiffs.

SHORT SELLING PRIMER: A bit more on short selling for those inexperienced in the sport. Short selling is a vital component of the markets. The ability of investors to sell short shares of overvalued companies keeps market valuations in check, and permits investors to hold hedged portfolios that are not dependent on constantly rising indices to make a positive return. There are risks, however, of going short that do not exist on the long side. For instance, if one purchases the shares of Acme Widget at $10/share, and Acme fails, you know precisely how much you will lose – your $10/share, and no more. If you were to short Acme Widget at $10/share and Acme were to discover a vast plutonium mine under their headquarters, those shares that were shorted at $10/share may have to be repurchased in the market at $100/share, $500/share, or even $1,000/share. The potential loss on a short sale is unlimited. For this reason, most professional long/short investors keep the size of their short positions much smaller than their long positions. For instance, if a core long position is 5% of capital, a core short may be 2%. Last week in Barron’s, famed short seller Jim Chanos discussed his lessons learned from the 1999-2000 internet bubble when he saw his AOL short go up eight times in value in his face. The lesson he drew was to keep individual shorts small relative to capital. Ackman’s $1 billion short in Herbalife is almost 10% of his reported $11 billion fund. If he is wrong, he may very well be putting his firm at risk due to the enormity of his short position relative to both Pershing Square’s and HLF’s size, and the potential difficulty of covering a short position of that magnitude in a “short squeeze”. Google the notorious Volkswagen/Porsche trade to see how dramatically these events can play out at the extremes.

To go short a company’s stock, one must borrow the shares to sell from a broker. Shorting without a proper borrow is called “naked shorting”, and is illegal. Holders of stock give their broker the right to lend out their shares in exchange for the flexibility of keeping margin accounts, and to participate in a portion of the fees short sellers incur for access to those shares. Short selling is conducted by the investor calling his broker, securing a borrow, and then executing the sale. Most companies have ample shares available to borrow, and this process yields little drama. However, in the case of controversial stocks, the demand to borrow shares may exceed the supply in the brokers “box”. If long holders sell shares brokers had out on loan to short sellers, the short seller must replace those borrowed shares he has lost access to with newly sourced shares. Should none be found, he will be forced to cover that portion of his position, and if unwilling to cover, the broker will involuntarily “buy him in”. This dynamic is what leads to short squeezes, where heavily shorted issues rapidly appreciate in the absence of any fundamental reason. Just look back to 2008 when the US government suddenly prohibited the shorting of financial stocks to see how painful that result can be for short sellers.

One effective defense for the short seller would be to have his broker contract on his behalf with a lender of shares to provide a quantity of shares for a specific term, at a negotiated payment. This insulates the short seller from buy-in risk for the duration of the contract. However, these contracts are individually negotiated, and somewhat rare. Also, they frequently permit the long holder to regain access to his shares if the company were to, for instance, conduct a self-tender offer for its shares. It is not known if Ackman has such an arrangement.

Ackman’s self-reported short position of 20 million HLF shares is over 75% of the reported short interest in Herbalife. At this point, the “borrow is tight” – there appears to be a near zero supply of shares available to sell short. The few brokers that will supply a borrow are charging as much as 20% of the value of the short annually for that access. This is a monster number – between the 20% negative-borrow and HLF’s dividend, it would cost nearly 25% each year to stay short HLF, all things remaining constant on those two variables.

HLF’s DEFENSE IS COMING:  Given the holiday timing, the best defense HLF has been able to muster has been to put a video of CEO Mike Johnson on its IR webpage defending the company broadly, and to schedule an investors’ day two weeks later, for 01/10/2013 in New York to address Ackman’s accusations in detail. The company has hired an impressive team of advisors. While most would have expected Bank of America/Merrill Lynch to get the assignment given their execution of last spring’s $400mm share repurchase, the task has been given to Moelis & Company, a well regarded, Los Angeles-based boutique investment banking firm. The firm’s namesake, Ken Moelis, is a disciple of Mike Milken from the height of Drexel Burnham’s power in the mid-1980’s. Moelis went on to a successful career at DLJ and UBS, where he became the premier investment banker to the casino gaming world, before launching his own shop.

Additionally, Herbalife has reportedly hired Boies, Shiller & Flexner the law firm founded by famed litigator David Boies. Consider Boies’ HLF team to be the Navy Seals Team 6 of litigation – you really don’t want them on the other side of your war. Note, I have no evidence that Bill Ackman is related to Osama bin Laden, and thus worthy of being targeted by DEVGRU (figuratively speaking, of course).

HLF promises a detailed rebuttal of the Ackman allegations on 01/10/2013, and I expect it will blow away the skeptics with a point-by-point dissection of Ackman’s claims. I presume Boies was brought on to bring suit against Ackman for some combination of libel, slander, defamation, tortuous interference and other imaginative causes of action. No matter how this turns out, the discovery, depositions and testimony should be highly enlightening and probably quite entertaining.

HLF’s DIRT CHEAP VALUATION:  So now, how might one value the shares of HLF in the bull case where Ackman is convincingly discredited by HLF CEO Johnson (a singular American bad-ass, according to my sources who know him personally here in L.A.) on 01/10/2013, and the market no longer ascribes risk to the feared FTC intervention (if I hear “headline risk” one more time …). EBITDA is a preferred valuation metric for a company like HLF that doesn’t have heavy capital expenditure requirements, and converts much of its reported earnings to cash that can be distributed as dividends or used to repurchase shares. Herbalife will produce over $725mm of earnings before interest, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) this year, a growth-stock worthy increase from $634mm in 2011 and $480mm in 2010. The few analysts that cover the stock project $800mm in 2013. Think of HLF’s gushing cash flow this way – HLF is printing EBITDA of over $2mm/day. That’s a heck of a lotta cheese with which to fight Ackman, who has and will be spending his own and his investors’ money on litigation and other matters (which won’t bother his limited partners until the stock is going up on a daily basis). HLF is lightly leveraged, with $500mm of bank debt, and quite liquid with $700mm of unused borrowing capacity and $300mm of cash. HLF currently pays $1.20/share in dividends annually on its ~108 million shares outstanding.

In the absence of controversy, the market would typically accord a fast growing, capital efficient company such as HLF a premium multiple. Let’s just assume the S&P 500 index current multiple of 8x EBITDA. This would yield a total enterprise value of 8x $725 of EBITDA = $5.8B. Deducting ~$500 million of debt, but giving credit for $150 of the cash (that is excess to the operating needs of the business), would yield a total equity value of $5.45B, which divided by the 108mm shares works out to $50.46/share. The current price of ~$30/share implies an EBITDA multiple of 4.7x. Tupperware, which is a MLM free from controversy, trades at 9.3x EBITDA, and Avon trades slightly higher. At $50/share, the share still would sport a dividend yield of 2.4%. Herbalife should report net income of about $4 per share this year and $4.50 in 2013 (ignoring the massive buyback I see coming). $30/share implies a 2012 P/E multiple of around 7x. The current S&P multiple is about 13x. For a company growing 15%+, you would expect to see a premium multiple, which is why brokerage firm analysts who cover the stock have target prices from $65 to $101. My valuation is lower, but should the Ackman-induced cloud be lifted, I can’t say those targets are absurd.

In fact, between the technical short squeeze that is in the making, the massively accretive impact of a $1B buyback, and the FTC risk fading away, I can’t say that I’d be surprised to see HLF trade back to its old highs of $70/share. If HLF has $500mm of 2013 net income, and buys back 30mm of around 110mm shares, the ultra-low interest rate environment makes the net income impact from interest expense miniscule (the HLF 13% EPS yield is 3-4x borrowing costs). Getting over $6/share in EPS is really not that hard to financially engineer, and between the short squeeze, comparable valuations, a below-market 11-12 P/E multiple would take HLF back into the $70s. Indeed, it could turn out even more financially salubrious than even these scenarios.

Ackman’s essentially fired nuclear missiles at HLF’s business model and its legality. When (and not “if”) HLF’s regulators and distributors essentially blow off Ackman’s claims as either old or no news, HLF will for all intents/purposes become bulletproof and battle tested. This may/should garner it a higher valuation than before Einhorn or Ackman ever showed up. That “what if” scenario gets you a $100/share stock price potential (again, only 15x $6-7/share in EPS gets you there; I’m not talking about a NFLX-level valuation here).

This hypothetical rally toward triple digits is not farfetched. In the event of a self-tender by HLF, or even without one, should the large institutional shareholders proactively remove their shares from the stock loan supply, there is great potential for short sellers being forced to cover as the borrow dries up. A panic to the upside could occur as the shorts are forced to buy in 25 million shares in a market unable to induce that many sellers. I am sure HLF and its capable teams of advisors are looking at the myriad of options to create value out of the chaos caused by this spectacular bear raid. Indeed, it does not take great imagination to see what could make these numbers dance.

In addition, Ackman has no shortage of enemies from my own polling of the audience. The odds favor Herbalife in this aspect of the battle. Ackman truly went all-in telling the world he has shorted ~20% of a relatively unlevered company trading at ~4x EBITDA.

BUT WHAT IF ACKMAN IS RIGHT?  His target price of zero implies the company is shut down globally, not just here in the US, which comprises only 20% of HLF’s global revenue. Is it possible? I guess so, but in my view no more than a very slim probability. More probable, in the unlikely case the FTC responds to Ackman’s presentation and reopens the same issues they have been policing for 32 years in the case of HLF, it is possible that the company could be forced to change some elements of how it conducts business in the US, and maybe elsewhere, leading to lower sales and margins. No doubt this would spook the market with fears that there was even more scrutiny to come, leading the market to value Herbalife at a discounted multiple on reduced earnings.
So let’s take a cut at that. Let’s say the FTC somehow compels business practice changes that reduce sales by 20% and lead to current pre-tax margins contracting by 25%. This would yield EBITDA of approximately $450mm, which at 5x would yield a share price of $17. Personally, I think there is about a 10% chance of this outcome. So weighting a 10% chance of $17/share, and a 90% chance of $50/share, I come up with a fair value of $47/share, which is why I own a boatload of shares purchased into the panic created by the bear raid. In fact, there is far more likelihood of another LBO of HLF (Golden Gate/Whitney stole it the first time around) than any other “headline risk.”

Ackman took his shot; now it is HLF’s turn.

MLM Detractor Blatantly Mischaracterizes the Law: Ignores Facts and Precedence

Bruce CraigRetired Wisconsin litigator, Bruce Craig, wrote an article featured on Seeking Alpha titled, “An Investor’s Guide to Identifying Pyramid Schemes.” While the title certainly implies a hint of objectivity, it’s simply false advertising . In a nutshell, the author holds on to his long-standing, 30+ year view that all MLMs are pyramids. Unfortunately, Craig willfully omits several well-known facts that obliterate his entire argument. It’s this kind of willful omission that makes him guilty of the very behavior he claims to be against.

Bruce’s thesis is simple: When analyzing a MLM for legality, retail sales do not matter…at all. In fact, he essentially concludes that all MLMs are illegal. If there’s any sort of recruitment element to a program, it’s “inherently deceptive” due to their “exponential characteristics.” In other words, with no limits on recruitment, epic doom is inevitable. This “all MLMs are pyramids” rationale is made crystal clear in Bruce Craig’s 2009 letter to the FTC when he says, “[The Amway case] has effectively legitimized pyramids, now called MLM’s.”

True North

I always respect people’s right to voice their opinions. While I might disagree with the points, I think good, open dialogue is the only path to progress. But…in the Seeking Alpha article, Bruce crosses a line. He is not providing objective, well-researched information to investors, as implied in the title. He’s making a carefully crafted argument. The article is “Outcome Determinative,” meaning he begins with the end in mind (all MLMs are pyramids) and stitches quotes together in support his argument. While making his argument, he leaves out several material bits of information.

Bruce Craig’s “True North” is ultimately protection of consumers. When he says he cares about consumers, I believe him. But as Abe Lincoln said in the recent movie (“Lincoln”), “What good is True North if you end up stuck in a swamp?” At some point, critics like Bruce need to be practical. Taking the position that all MLMs are illegal immediately removes you from the conversation. Completely. And without influence, there’s no change. The industry is not going away. Instead of drawing hard lines and praying for a nuclear bomb to decimate the entire industry, wiping out even the cleanest of companies, he and critics like him should try to offer suggestions to make the industry better. I have a personal experience of being hammered with the political process. I tried to pass an anti-pyramid bill in Tennessee in 2010. The bill was killed by the DSA. Instead of whining about the political process (as done in nearly every article posted by critics), I joined the DSA. I’m a firm believer that the right ideas win over time. Bruce’s article lacks objectivity, which is why it will only serve to excite the critics and be largely ignored by everyone else, including regulators.

I’m going to address Bruce’s points in no particular order.

Market Uncertainty With Respect to MLMs

When writing about his motivation for the article, Bruce writes, “The recent incident involving David Einhorn and Herbalife (HLF) drew my attention to the stock market and the subject of pyramid schemes. It seemed that the significant drop in Herbalife’s stock price reflected a market uncertainty about the inherent stability and legality of this company.”

This is false. As a quick recap, Einhorn asked a few questions during an earnings call with Herbalife. During the call with Einhorn and shortly thereafter, Herbalife’s stock dropped 20% ($1.7 Billion loss in value). The market was not reacting to uncertainties about Herbalife’s model, the market was reacting to Einhorn. Einhorn is a legend on Wall Street, having successfully shorted multiple companies, including Lehman Brothers and Green Mountain Coffee. The market perceived that Einhorn smelled blood with Herbalife. Herbalife’s stock dropped 10% during Einhorn’s 5 minute conversation on the earnings call. 5 minutes is hardly enough time for analysts to research MLM law and thoughtfully conclude that the Herbalife stock was junk. They were reacting to Einhorn. Despite this “market uncertainty,” the other publicly traded companies in the MLM industry are doing just fine. The average rate of return on the publicly traded MLMs is well over 30%, soundly beating the DOW, NASDAQ and the S&P 500. It’s not even close.

Misleading Analysis on BurnLounge

In his article, Craig referenced a definition in the judge’s final order against BurnLounge. This case represents the most recent case against a pyramid scheme. In the final order, the court defined “Prohibited Marketing Scheme” as:

An illegal pyramid sales scheme . . . in which participants pay money or valuable consideration in return for which they obtain the right to receive rewards for recruiting other participants into the program, and those rewards are unrelated to the sale of products or services to ultimate users. For purposes of this definition, ‘sale of products or services to ultimate users does not include sales to other participants or recruits or to the participants’ own accounts.

If you were to read this definition out of context, it would certainly seem that it’s illegal to pay commissions on product consumption generated by distributors (known as internal consumption). In fact, if interpreted literally, this sort of definition would spell the end of the network marketing industry, period. Bruce takes advantage of this quote and contrasts it with a seemingly contradictory statement the FTC made in 2004. In the FTC’s Advisory Memo to the DSA, it said, “In fact, the amount of internal consumption in any multi-level compensation business does not determine whether or not the FTC will consider the plan a pyramid scheme.

There are 3 key facts that Bruce fails to mention:

1) The definition in the BurnLounge order is IDENTICAL to the definition found in another case against a pyramid scheme twelve years ago (FTC vs. Equinox). The FTC’s advisory memo quoted by Bruce came well after the Equinox case. The FTC made its position clear: Paying commissions on internal consumption is fine.

2) The definition that Bruce quoted was specifically limited to the BurnLounge case. First, it’s clear when it reads, “For purposes of this Final Judgment….the following definitions shall apply.” Second, Bruce failed to reference the other part of the FTC’s memo…the one that clearly says that the definitions found in the Orders do not represent the “general state of the law.” It’s pretty important…and he left it out. The memo says,

[T]he FTC often enters into consent orders with individuals and companies that the Commission has determined have violated the FTC act. To protect the public from those who demonstrated unwillingness follow the law, these orders often contain provisions that place extra constraints upon a wrongdoer that do not apply to the general public. These ‘fencing-in’ provisions only apply to the defendant signing the order. . .”.

It’s crystal clear. Despite what Bruce was suggesting in his article, the FTC was not contradicting itself in the BurnLounge order. It’s doing exactly what it’s been doing over the past twenty years. Bruce Craig is not a disinterested reporter looking to provide help for investors. He’s an opportunist taking advantage of media generated by David Einhorn to lob a grenade at an industry he clearly hates.

3) Bruce fails to reference the BurnLounge Statement of Decision. Prior to the Final Order, the judge wrote a 31 page opinion where he stated his conclusion about BurnLounge. I summarized this BurnLounge Statement of Decision on my site. While Bruce argues that retail sales have no place in pyramid scheme analysis, the judge in BurnLounge dedicated almost 10 pages to the value of the BurnLounge product (or lack thereof). He ultimately concluded that the products had SOME marginal value; thus, he discounted the amount of consumer harm. If everything hinged on the “exponential characteristics” of the marketing plan, as submitted by Bruce, there would be zero need to discuss the product. Bottom line: retail sales DO matter. If the products have legitimate value as demonstrated by retail sales, it’s indicative of a legitimate program. Speaking of retail sales, even the FTC’s own economist, Peter VanderNat, wrote about the importance of retail sales when distinguishing legitimate MLMs from pyramids. There’s just no way around it: retail sales matter.

The rationale that led Bruce Craig to reference a single sentence out of context while ignoring the 31 page Statement of Decision is beyond me.

Tolman Case

While Bruce was eager to reference two pyramid cases from over 35 years ago, he ignores a case that was published in 2004. In Tolman, the court held that paying commissions on downline purchases “does not, by itself, render a multi-level marketing scheme an illegal pyramid.” Paying commissions on internal consumption is perfectly legal.

Bottom Line

Critics are desperate. It’s not just Bruce Craig. There have been a number of negative reports lately, all having commonality on a certain line of thought: “MLMs say that everyone can win….and since people fail, it’s fraud.” They’ll use words like “destined to collapse” without referencing a single case of market saturation. And they’ll never reference the technology tools available today that eliminate all geographic barriers for distributors; thus, negating their saturation arguments. They simply hate the space and they want it gone. And now they’re growing angry because they’ve been largely ignored by the FTC over the past several years. It’s not a surprise: their position is logically, politically and economically untenable.

The space needs to improve. I agree on that point. I’ve written exhaustively about my ideas to improve the MLM space. The industry is not perfect, but it’s still a great space. And whether the critics like it or not, the business model is accelerating. Peer to peer advertising is a much more cost effective and efficient means of distributing unique products and services. While I agree that the space needs to improve, I take exception when another lawyer makes an argument while leaving out material information. It’s just poor form.

If you found this post informative, please hit the +1 button above. And to continue following me, check out my Google Plus page. Also, feel free to subscribe via email.


VanderSloot Denies Melaleuca Operates as a MLM

SMH.  It’s a new acronym I’ve recently learned.  It means “Shaking My Head.”  And that’s what I immediately did when I read about Melaleuca’s CEO, Frank VanderSloot, denying all ties to the MLM industry.

While it certainly seems like a ridiculous exercise, I list a few obvious reasons in the video why VanderSloot is wrong to make such a distinction.

In the video, I reference his statement to the press (included below). I also reference the FTC’s definition of a “Multilevel marketing program” as per the FTC vs. FUTURENET case.

Note, this is not a controlling definition given the circumstances of the case; however, it gives us a good idea of how the FTC defines a MLM.

FTC’s definition:

“Multi-level marketing program” means any marketing program in which participants pay money to the program promoter in return for which the participants obtain the right to (1) recruit additional participants, or to have additional participants placed by the promoter or any other person into the program participant’s downline, tree, cooperative, income center, or other similar program grouping; (2) sell goods or services; and (3) receive payment or other compensation; provided that: (a) the payments received by each program participant are derived primarily from retail sales of goods or services, and not from recruiting additional participants nor having additional participants placed into the program participant’s downline, tree, cooperative, income center, or other similar program grouping; and (b) the marketing program has instituted and enforces rules to ensure that it is not a plan in which participants earn profits primarily by the recruiting of additional participants rather than retail sales.”

Essentially, it boils down to whether there’s a recruitment component to a pay plan. If there’s an an opportunity for an override commission from downline productivity, where participants can sponsor other participants and earn income from their sales, it’s a MLM. Using the factors above, and some of the obvious factors referenced in the video, Melaleuca would clearly qualify as a MLM. There’s an enrollment fee that gives people the right to sponsor other participants (element #1) and the right to sell products (element #2), which gives people the ability to receive payment for product volume (element #3) assuming the commissions are not driven by enrollment fees.

VanderSloot’s Statement

(emphasis mine)

“It’s unfortunate that someone would suggest that Melaleuca is something like Amway. It’s not. We started Melaleuca 26 years ago to market environmentally responsible products and to provide a business opportunity for folks who weren’t successful in climbing the corporate ladder and didn’t inherit wealth from their parents. We try to be champions of the little guy. My father was a little guy. And I still see myself as a little guy.

Contrary to those who do not know us, our business model is nothing like Amway or Herbalife. I challenge anyone to find any similarity whatsoever. There is no investment of any kind unless you want to call a $29 membership fee an “investment.” And anyone can get a refund on that by just asking.

We do offer a home-based business opportunity. But it is no “pyramid scheme.” We have long been critical of the many MLM/pyramid schemes operating in this country. I agree with those who say that typical MLM companies destroy people’s finances. Most are designed to attract people to “invest” in large purchases with the promise of “getting rich” quickly by getting others to invest. The guy at the top always wins and the guy on the bottom always loses.

In Melaleuca’s case there is no investment and no getting others to invest. We do pay commissions to those who have referred customers based on what those customers purchase. There is really no way to lose money on referring customers. And there’s no way for customers to lose either when they’re buying high-quality products at grocery store prices. Customers just order the products they use every month directly from the factory. We have hundreds of thousands of customers who buy from us each month. They don’t ever resell anything. They don’t invest in any inventory. There can be no pyramiding without some kind of investment. In 26 years, no one has ever complained that they lost money. It’s simply not possible.

Our business model works pretty well for most folks. We have already paid over $2.9 billion in commissions to households across the country. Our mission is to enhance lives by helping people reach their goals regardless of their beliefs, backgrounds, or affiliations. Last month we sent out almost 200,000 checks to American households alone. Members of those households tell us we are doing a pretty good job achieving that mission.”

FTC vs. BurnLounge – Case Summary

A few months ago, I published a concise ebook that summarized the FTC / BurnLounge decision.  This ebook was pre-released only for my MLM newsletter subscribers.  Now, it’s available for you.  The article is below. There’s a lot to be learned from this decision. If you prefer a PDF copy, click here.  It’s a concise summary of exactly what went wrong with the BurnLounge business model. And I apologize if the formatting is a little janky in spots. I had a hard time converting the Word file to work with this page

Introduction

BurnLounge was a purported network marketing company. They positioned themselves as a blend between iTunes, MySpace and Amway. The FTC filed its initial complaint against Burnlounge in June of 2007. After a bench trial (and a two year wait), the judge held Burnlounge to be an illegal pyramid scheme.

Facts

Business model

It’s important to understand the Burnlounge model for purposes of understanding the pyramid scheme analysis. Also, it’s beneficial to understand the Burnlounge model because their failure is very informative for other companies in the network marketing space. At its core, Burnlounge created a network of replicated websites, referred to as “BurnPages.” These BurnPages allowed the independent “retailers” (a/k/a distributors) to sell music and other items. There were multiple entry points into the Burnlounge program:

1) Retailer: Paid a $30 fee for the right to operate their own BurnPage. Retailers were not eligible to receive income from music sales. Instead, they received “Burn-Rewards,” which they could redeem for music.

2) Mogul: If they wanted to earn cash rewards, they had to pay $7 per month and purchase one of the below product packages. Upon this occurrence, they were dubbed “Moguls.”

Product Packages

1) Basic: Basic members pay a $7 monthly fee in addition to paying $30 for the Basic package. The package included:

a. BurnPage

b. Editing software for the BurnPage

c. Back-office support

d. Sample copy of BurnLounge Magazine

e. Annual subscription to “FrontBurner Magazine, which was an online website.

2) Exclusive: Exclusive members pay a $7 monthly fee in addition to paying $130 for the Exclusive package. The package included:

a. All of the items in the Basic package

b. Annual subscription to “BurnLounge Presents,” which was a monthly bundle of 10 songs selected by the company and available for download

c. Monthly DVD subscription featuring independent artists chosen by the company

d. Annual subscription to “BurnLounge Magazine”

3) VIP: VIP members pay a $7 monthly fee in addition to paying $430 for the VIP package. The package included:

a. All of the items in the Basic and Exclusive packages

b. The “Event Pass,” which provided for better seating and early access admissions at certain concert events

c. “BurnLounge University,” which consisted of six DVDs documenting the history of the music industry.

NOTE: Retailers always maintain the option of converting to “Moguls” at any time. The vast majority of Retailers chose to become Moguls (97%).
 

Compensation Plan

The BurnLounge compensation plan is confusing. When referencing it, the judge wrote, “Indeed, it would appear that BurnLounge was attempting to create a labyrinth of obfuscation rather than a readily understood compensation system.” Essentially, there were multiple income opportunities in the BurnLounge plan. There was a unilevel component where the participants earned a percentage of the volume generated by their personally enrolled representatives. In addition to this program, Moguls earned the “real money” in the binary plan. In order to qualify for the binary compensation, Moguls had to “sell” two VIP packages to members in their downline (the VIP package was the most expensive offering) and hit monthly performance standards. In the binary plan, Moguls earned a percentage of the total volume from their business by optimizing their two legs.

Income Claims

 


BurnLounge had policies in place that prohibited the field from making income claims. Despite this policy, aggressive income claims were still made by top leaders. Claims were made where people said they were earning in excess of $200,000 in income. BurnLounge officers testified that they made efforts to police the income claims. BL’s head of Customer Service testified that he dealt with income claim issues a few times a week. Furthermore, BL’s Executive Vice President made a strong statement from a company event about the importance of ending the use of income claims. According to BL, nobody was ever terminated for making income claims. While it was discouraged, apparently nobody was penalized.When income claims were made, income disclosures were not provided to the prospective participants. The FTC argued that the income claims made by field leaders was pervasive throughout the BurnLounge organization.

Issues

Was BurnLounge operating as an illegal pyramid scheme? Were the income claims made by BurnLounge leaders “misleading?”

Law

Pyramid Scheme

Operating a pyramid scheme is an unfair and deceptive act affecting commerce, which triggers the FTC Act. Pyramid schemes are inherently fraudulent because they’re destined to collapse.As determined by the Koscot case, pyramid schemes are:

Characterized by the payment by participants of money to the company in return for which they receive (1) the right to sell a product and (2) the right to receive in return for recruiting other participants into the program rewards which are unrelated to the sale of the product to ultimate users.”

The judge referenced Omnitrition, which is an unpopular case in the MLM industry. Referencing Omnitrition, the judge wrote, “The satisfaction of the second element of the Koscot test is the sine qua non of a pyramid scheme.

Income Claims

“A statement is misleading if the representation is likely to deceive reasonable consumers to their detriment.” Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. FTC.

Application of the Law to the Facts

Pyramid Scheme? BL consisted of two components: 1) the sale of music and music-related products through the BL software; and 2) the BL Mogul program, which was the income opportunity. It was only through the latter that anyone could possibly achieve any “significant financial return.”

MLM Attorney Commentary: Given the minuscule amount of revenue accrued from external sales (3%), it was apparent to the court that the only real way to earn income via the BL opportunity was by focusing almost exclusively on recruiting new participants who purchased the product for themselves. After a detailed breakdown of the BL offering and prices, the court concluded the BL prices were gratuitously inflated to support the pay plan.

“[B]ecause participation in the program required the purchase of a product package, and Moguls earned cash for selling these product packages to those they sponsored, they by default received compensation for recruiting others into the program.” The Basic package was the only required package, technically. The court wrote,

BurnLounge argues that the sale of the Basic Package is the sale of a product to an ultimate user. While it is true that the BurnPage could be considered a “product” and a Retailer to be the “user” of that product, this argument ignores the nature of the use itself. That it is a tool for sales and (more importantly) for recruitment, as demonstrated by a review of the BurnLounge promotional material, the presentations of its spokespersons, and the statistics as to the participants who bought into the enterprise. While it is true that Retailers could merely sell music downloads through their BurnPages, Retailers/Moguls generated many times more revenue from the sale of the business opportunity to new participants than the meager rewards of vending the music downloads available on the BurnLounge system.

MLM Attorney Commentary: In order for a transaction to be commissionable, the item sold needs to have some kind of relevance for people outside of the program, lest it be labeled a recruitment scheme. With the Basic package, the court concluded the BurnPages to essentially be “non commissionable” because they were primarily used as tools by distributors to sell music and recruit more distributors, not as actual products.

Unlike the Basic package, the premium packages, the Exclusive and VIP packages, were optional. BL argued that the sale of these packages were truly sales to end users. The court acknowledged that the items bundled in the Exclusive and the VIP packages had SOME value (“extremely limited”). However, regardless of this limited value, the court concluded that it was the financial incentives that ultimately led the BL distributors to purchase those items. Because of this fact, the court concluded that the sale of the Exclusive and VIP packages were pyramidal in nature. Specifically, the court held, “Inventory loading pyramids are not illegal simply because there are wholesale purchasing requirements. They are illegal because the purchases are incentivized by commissions that result from recruiting others to join the scheme through similar purchases.” (emphasis mine)

MLM Attorney Commentary: “MOTIVE” is the key word here. Because of the limited value of the items coupled with the small external sales (3%), the judge concluded that the primary driver that led distributors to buy the premium packages was the compensation plan. In my opinion, it’s ill-advised to make certain rewards in the pay plan contingent on a distributor purchasing a certain item. Distributors should never be required to purchase a higher ticket item in exchange for an ability to earn more compensation. It can always be argued that the true motivation behind those purchases is for the money, not for the value. It makes no sense for a company to expose itself to the additional risk.

Misleading Income Claims? The defendants (BurnLounge and the individual leaders) argued that the misleading statements about income were mere “puffery” i.e. not material. “Generalized or exaggerated statements upon which reasonable consumers would not rely are considered ‘puffery’ and are non-actionable.” With BurnLounge, the judge found that the statements were not vague. On the contrary, the statements were very specific. The judge further noted, “In addition, where a person markets [a pyramid scheme], he/she must at a minimum advise potential investors of the unlikelihood of any substantial returns. The court concluded that the defendants did not provide the material information

MLM Attorney Commentary: Whenever an income claim is made, whether it is express or implied, it’s imperative that adequate income disclosures be provided. Since the company is usually not involved in making income claims, it’s important to (a) provide good income disclosures to the field; and (b) implement AND ENFORCE policies designed to get the leaders to share those disclosures with prospects when income claims are made. With BurnLounge, it appears that they actually had policies in place against sharing income claims; however, those policies seem to have been ignored. If those policies were actually enforced and their was a history of enforcement i.e. suspensions and terminations, this particular issue might have been mitigated.


Conclusion

 


After waiting for two years after the trial, the judge finally concluded that BurnLounge was, in fact, a pyramid scheme. It’s important for serious students of the network marketing industry should take a hard look at this case. There’s a lot to be learned. In my opinion, if I were to point out one toxic element in their business model that ultimately led to the regulatory action, it would be the extra incentives in the compensation plan that led the majority of BL participants to buy the premium packages. The compensation plan drives behavior. When the barrier to the “real money” was the purchase of a premium package, the vast majority of participants will do it regardless if they really want the products. This appears to be the case with BurnLounge. While BurnLounge tried hard to argue that its products were valuable, the extra incentives in the pay plan provided an easy opportunity for the FTC to argue that the participants bought the bundles to crack into bigger commissions. Simple mistakes, big consequences.

If you learned anything at all by reading this article, please take the time to hit the +1 button above or the Like button. Share the love!

Do you think this was a fair decision?

FTC Targets Acai Seller

The Federal Trade Commission has filed a complaint to stop LeanSpa, a weight loss company that has allegedly used fake news websites from affiliate marketers to promote its acai products.  LeanSpa parties apparently used affiliate marketers to drive interest to their program.  Allegedly, the affiliates used “fake news sites” to fein credibility about the products and drive traffic to the main site; thus, earning themselves commissions.  In its press release, the FTC states,

The complaint alleges that the defendants hired affiliate marketers who used fake news websites to promote the defendants’ products. The fake news websites used domain names that appear to be objective news or health sites, such as channel8health.com, dailyhealth6.com, and online6health.com. . . The fake news sites had links to the defendants’ own websites, where consumers were offered trial samples of two weight-loss dietary supplements: an acai-berry product and a colon cleanse product. The affiliate marketers earned a commission for each consumer who landed on their sites and signed up for a trial.”

There are three things that stand-out with this lawsuit that are relevant for the MLM community.

First, never outsource the creation of marketing materials without proper guidelines.

In the case mentioned above, the FTC highlighted the marketing practices leveraged by the affiliates.  The affiliates were obviously creating their own marketing materials, leading them to pretend to be objective reporters and using with legitimate-looking domain names. Although they were not agents of the company, the behavior still got the company in serious trouble.  With MLM companies, it’s more complex than a simple affiliate model.  With a MLM model, it’s specifically designed to not only recruit and retain first level affiliates, it’s designed to empower those individuals to sponsor and train other people. It’s an affiliate model on steroids.  With this in mind, it’s imperative for companies to at least maintain approval-rights before a leader can develop MLM training.  This includes restraining the field’s ability to create internet landing pages.  It seems harsh, but it’s the irresponsible 1% that can lead to the ship burning down.

Second, when making endorsements, affiliates must disclose their relationship

In the past, I wrote about the revised FTC guidelines.  In these guidelines, the FTC makes it painfully clear that when there’s a financial connection between an endorser and a business, the endorser is obligated it disclose the relationship.  Specifically, it requires disclosure when: “When there exists a connection between the endorser and the seller of the advertised product that might materially affect the weight or credibility of the endorsement (i.e., the connection is not reasonably expected by the audience), such connection must be fully disclosed.”  With LeanSpa, the affiliates were trying to pretend to be objective reports, which put the company at substantial risk.

Third, avoid the “Negative-Option Continuity” plan

This one is just plain common-sense.  A negative-option plan is one where a participant is automatically enrolled in an autoship and they need to specifically opt-out. With LeanSpa, apparently people were enticed into purchasing small samples of the product.  However, they failed to realize that they were also committing to a monthly $80 purchase of inventory. If a MLM business has an autoship program, it’s vital to ensure the distributor specifically chooses to participate in the program.  Do not allow the sponsor to enroll the distributor into an autoship program without express consent.  And be candid about the financial commitment involved.

Bonus: Playing dumb never works.

It would be easy for a company like LeanSpa to say, “we’re not able to control how these people market our products.”  At the end of the day, the FTC is not going to buy the argument. Companies cannot reap the benefits of misrepresentation without accepting responsibility from the methods by which the benefits were obtained. While it’s hard to run a tight ship, it’s incumbent upon every MLM company to do it right given the high stakes. MLM compliance departments are very important.

What are your thoughts?  Do you see any poorly run websites out there run by distributors?  How should the company monitor the web to prevent it?

FTC’s tips for discerning good companies from bad

Debra Valentine, General Counsel for the FTC, provided the following tips for consumers when discerning good companies from bad ones.  She gave the speech in 1998, which makes it a little dated.  BUT, I was doing some research and found this article interesting and thought you might find it informative. To read the complete article, go here.

START

Here are some tips that consumers and business might find helpful.

1. Beware of any plan that makes exaggerated earnings claims, especially when there seems to be no real underlying product sales or investment profits. The plan could be a Ponzi scheme where money from later recruits pays off earlier ones. Eventually this program will collapse, causing substantial injury to most participants.

2. Beware of any plan that offers commissions for recruiting new distributors, particularly when there is no product involved or when there is a separate, up-front membership fee. At the same time, do not assume that the presence of a purported product or service removes all danger. The Commission has seen pyramids operating behind the apparent offer of investment opportunities, charity benefits, off-shore credit cards, jewelry, women’s underwear, cosmetics, cleaning supplies, and even electricity.

3. If a plan purports to sell a product or service, check to see whether its price is inflated, whether new members must buy costly inventory, or whether members make most “sales” to other members rather than the general public. If any of these conditions exist, the purported “sale” of the product or service may just mask a pyramid scheme that promotes an endless chain of recruiting and inventory loading.

4. Beware of any program that claims to have a secret plan, overseas connection or special relationship that is difficult to verify. Charles Ponzi claimed that he had a secret method of trading and redeeming millions of postal reply coupons. The real secret was that he stopped redeeming them. Likewise, CDI allegedly represented that it had the backing of a special overseas bank when no such relationship existed.

5. Beware of any plan that delays meeting its commitments while asking members to “keep the faith.” Many pyramid schemes advertise that they are in the “pre-launch” stage, yet they never can and never do launch. By definition pyramid schemes can never fulfill their obligations to a majority of their participants. To survive, pyramids need to keep and attract as many members as possible. Thus, promoters try to appeal to a sense of community or solidarity, while chastising outsiders or skeptics. Often the government is the target of the pyramid’s collective wrath, particularly when the scheme is about to be dismantled. Commission attorneys now know to expect picketers and a packed courtroom when they file suit to halt a pyramid scheme. Half of the pyramid’s recruits may see themselves as victims of a scam that we took too long to stop; the other half may view themselves as victims of government meddling that ruined their chance to make millions. Government officials in Albania have also experienced this reaction in the recent past.

6. Finally, beware of programs that attempt to capitalize on the public’s interest in hi-tech or newly deregulated markets. Every investor fantasizes about becoming wealthy overnight, but in fact, most hi-tech ventures are risky and yield substantial profits only after years of hard work. Similarly, deregulated markets can offer substantial benefits to investors and consumers, but deregulation seldom means that “everything goes,” that no rules apply, and that pyramid or Ponzi schemes are suddenly legitimate.

END